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Abstract--Static security constraint management, formulated as 
security constrained optimal power flow (SCOPF), is one of the 
critical tasks performed during planning and operation. These 
constraints at any operating point can be divided into noncritical 
and critical constraints, where former can be managed with 
preventive controls, while the latter cannot. The violation of at least 
one critical constraint indicates that network is overstressed and 
needs a prompt activation of remedial actions to preserve system 
integrity. Accordingly, critical constraint violations (CCVs) must 
be identified by solving related SCOPF problem, as information on 
their types and locations can help to devise and activate optimal 
remedial actions. However, when dealing with overstressed 
systems, conventional SCOPF methods may not be able to identify 
CCVs due to problem infeasibility and there is no commonly 
accepted method to find related CCVs. Extending previously 
developed metaheuristic approach, this paper first identifies the 
CCVs and then proposes a novel methodology to devise the most 
effective remedial actions to mitigate overstressed system operating 
conditions. The practical relevance of the remedial actions is 
demonstrated using IEEE 30-bus, 39-bus and 57-bus test networks.  
 
Index Terms--Critical and noncritical constraints, constraint 
management, conventional and metaheuristic optimization, 
remedial actions, security constrained optimal power flow. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
ANAGEMENT and control of system security constraints is 
one of the most important tasks during both planning and 
operation of power systems. These security limits are typically 
expressed as bus voltage and branch thermal limits (i.e. steady 
state security limits), as well as voltage and angle stability limits 
(i.e. dynamic security limits). The related analysis is commonly 
denoted as a “security constraint management” (SCM) [1], 
which essentially has two stages: a) identification of violated 
security constraints and, b) activation of appropriate corrective 
actions for resolving violated constraints. 
In terms of applied controls, this paper makes distinction 
between “preventive controls” (e.g. generation rescheduling, re-
adjustment of transformer taps, reactive power compensation, 
etc.), which are generally implemented for balancing power 
flows during normal and alert operating states, and “emergency 
controls” (e.g. load shedding, connection of emergency 
reserves, islanding, etc.), which are activated in case of system 
inability to balance power flows. Following a disturbance, the 
readjustment of preventive controls may or may not resolve all 
resulting constraint violations. The violated constraints that 
cannot be resolved by adjusting preventive controls are in this 
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paper denoted as “critical constraint violations” (CCVs) and 
presence of at least one CCV indicates that the corresponding 
disturbance will develop into overstressed or emergency 
conditions, typically following a severe contingency [2]. While 
noncritical constraint violations (NCCVs) can be managed with 
preventive controls (automatic or operator initiated), CCVs 
require prompt activation of emergency controls, i.e. remedial 
actions, to prevent further activation of protection and triggering 
of cascaded tripping, possibly leading to system blackouts [3].   
If the transition from pre-contingency to post-contingency 
states involves only NCCVs, an experienced operator may 
successfully select adequate remedial actions to manage all 
violated constraints. However, if the transition involves CCVs, 
the most effective remedial actions must be computed 
algorithmically, as it will be difficult for an operator to select 
appropriate remedial actions based on previous experience [4]. 
In that context, this paper discusses how security constrained 
optimal power flow (SCOPF) can be used by network operators 
and planners to devise optimal remedial actions for resolving 
CCVs. SCOPF is a constrained, nonlinear and non-convex 
optimization problem, which is typically solved by conventional 
(gradient-based), or metaheuristic (gradient-free) approaches. In 
case of an overstressed system, featuring one or more CCVs, the 
conventional SCOPF algorithms may fail to converge due to 
problem infeasibility or diverge due to the inability to input 
proper initial values.  
The identification of CCVs is essential from both the 
optimization point of view, as CCVs are the actual cause of 
convergence problems in conventional algorithms, and from 
operational point of view, as CCVs indicate where in the 
network and in relation to which network components optimal 
remedial actions should be planned (during the planning stage) 
and activated (during the operational stage). There is currently 
no commonly accepted method in nonlinear programming for 
identification and handling of CCVs [5]-[6], although [2] 
proposes one metaheuristic approach to identify CCVs. 
In accordance with the prevailing industrial terminology, 
SCM can be further divided into congestion management (CM) 
and volt-var control (VVC). There has been much previous 
work on CM and VVC based on the use of generation 
rescheduling and load shedding [7]- [10], distributed generation 
[11]-[12], FACTS devices [13]-[15], demand side management 
[16]-[17], energy storage [18], and transmission switching [19]-
[21]. Earlier studies were mostly concerned with contingencies 
that will push the system into an alert state and paid less 
attention to system emergency state, where, if adequate control 
actions are not promptly implemented, changes in power flows 
and energy balance will result in the inability of conventional 
algorithms to converge. In addition, especially from the context 
Remedial Actions for Security Constraint 
Management of Overstressed Power Systems 
Jagadeesh Gunda, Student Member, IEEE, Gareth P. Harrison, Senior Member, IEEE and Sasa Z. 
Djokic, Senior Member, IEEE 
M 
 2 
of constraint management, the steady state and dynamic security 
analysis in most of the earlier works is addressed separately. 
Neglecting the violation of steady state security constraints and 
the corresponding protection operations, a system may 
successfully transit from pre- to post-disturbance state. In this 
case, the state trajectory or system is dynamically secure, but 
the post-disturbance state may or may not qualify for the steady 
state security.  If it is not, protection system will trip the 
overloaded lines which introduce further dynamics and the 
network may not reach the steady state. 
This paper focuses on the following problem: If severe 
contingency results in emergency conditions, i.e. in overstressed 
system, what are the most effective remedial actions for 
returning the system into secure state, in terms of minimizing 
required system reserves, switching actions and load shedding? 
In this context, the paper provides the following contributions:  
• Presents a novel methodology for selecting optimum remedial 
actions, using a metaheuristic SCOPF analysis to identify 
minimum number and extent of CCVs, in which overstressed 
system state is mapped to the corresponding SCM problem; 
• Demonstrates how information on CCVs and injection 
sensitivity factors can be used to implement selected remedial 
actions at target network locations, requiring fewer reserves, 
less switching actions and shedding of minimum, or no load. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section II outlines the 
remedial action framework and describes the implementation of 
various remedial actions. Simulation results on the test networks 
are presented in Section III. The main contributions, 
observations, and limitations of the approach are discussed in 
Section IV. Section V concludes the paper. 
II.   METHODOLOGY FOR SELECTING REMEDIAL ACTIONS 
A.  Analytical Framework 
As mentioned, (prolonged) operation of the network with 
CCVs will result in further activation of protection systems, 
leading to (extreme) emergency conditions and cascade faults. 
Assuming the operator is responsible for returning the system 
into a normal or alert state and that active and reactive power 
reserves are available as the means of remedial actions, 
operator should select and implement the most effective 
controls at the best locations. As the network is overstressed, 
failure to do so might further degrade system security. 
Typically, under emergency operating conditions, there 
will be a (large) number of constraint violations, i.e. line 
overloading and bus under/over voltage alarms, which 
operator should immediately address by devising effective 
remedial actions. These must be computed and implemented 
in such a way that unnecessary switching and control 
operations are avoided, not only to minimize the usage of 
system reserves, but also to prevent the further adverse effect 
on system dynamics in post-contingency state [22]. For that 
purpose, this paper presents a novel SCOPF formulation, 
where one metaheuristic approach is used for identification of 
the minimum number/extent of CCVs, i.e. to diagnose the 
overstressed system state and devise most effective remedial 
action that should be implemented. The methodology is 
illustrated in Fig. 1 and has the following four main stages: 
1. Initiate disturbance and perform analysis of steady state 
security constraints in post-disturbance state; 
2. If any of the constraints is violated, employ conventional 
SCOPF analysis to re-adjust preventive controls; 
3. If the conventional SCOPF method fails to converge, i.e. if 
there are critical constraints, CCVs, employ metaheuristic 
approach with suitable penalization to identify CCVs; 
4. Classify the SCM problem and employ relevant remedial 
action(s). 
The final stage considers a range of potential solutions for 
remedial actions, depending on whether the CCVs are related to 
line loading, or bus voltage constraints. Accordingly, this paper 
considers: load shedding and demand side management (DSM), 
distributed generation (DG) dispatch and reactive power 
control. The stages are explained in the following sections. 
 
Fig. 1. A general methodology for devising optimal remedial actions. 
B.  Disturbance Initiation and Analysis of Constraint Violations 
The evaluation process starts by initiating a disturbance, e.g. 
a fault resulting in a contingency, which is in this paper 
deliberately chosen to lead to an overstressed system and CCVs. 
After protection clears the fault, the system is analysed 
immediately after the contingency, before the effect of any 
automatic or other control. This is carried out by solving an 
unconstrained power flow with pre-contingency (optimal) 
control set points applied on a post-contingency configured-
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NO
DIVERGES
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NO
Start
Network is in normal state and then disturbance happened 
Monitor security parameters (bus voltages and branch flows) and compute Total 
Number of Security Constraint Violations (TNSCV)
Network is steady state unsecure; Need to activate preventive controls
Formulate the SCOPF problem to find the secure operating point with TNSCV=0
Solve SCOPF with conventional numerical algorithm
Classify SCM problem and select most effective remedial action (RA) 
1. If CCV involves thermal contraints, SCM-->CM; RA --> Load shedding, DSM, 
DG, Network switching, Energy Storage, etc
2. If CCV involves only voltage violations; SCM-->VVC; RA --> Shunt 
capacitors, DG, FACTS devices, etc.
Optimal preventive
controls are found; 
TNSCV=0; System is 
SECURE; No Remedial 
action is required. 
TNSCV=0
System is SECURE;
No further control 
is required. 
Algorithm 
converges?
TNSCV > 0 with 
infeasible reactive 
power generation
Numerical calculation failed; No solution
System is OVERSTRESSED and UNSECURE; Remedial Action is required 
Identify critical constraint violations (CCV) from TNSCV 
using Metaheuristic based CCV identification approach  
Activate selected remedial action scheme 
System returned to secure operating region
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network. If any of the security constraints is violated, the next 
step is to try to resolve violated constraints by re-adjusting 
preventive control settings using SCOPF analysis. 
C.  Finding Secure and Optimal Operating Point with SCOPF 
Conventional SCOPF methods are typically used to identify 
a feasible/secure operating point with no constraint violation, 
for which settings of electrical control variables are adjusted, so 
the stipulated objective function is optimized. Accordingly, the 
SCOPF problem can be formulated as: 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚.    𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥0,𝑢𝑢0) (1) 
𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡.    𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐 ,𝑢𝑢0) = 0 (2) 
ℎ(𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐 ,𝑢𝑢0 ) ≤ 0, 𝑐𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐶 = {0,1, 2, …𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐} (3) 
where: x, u - state and control variables, c - contingency index 
(zero for base case), g, h - equality and inequality constraints, 
C - set of credible contingencies, f - objective function (in this 
paper, fuel cost and active power losses, optimized separately).  
An interior point OPF solver from [23] is employed as a 
conventional method, with all constraints treated as hard, unless 
stated otherwise [2]. Bus voltage and line loading limits are 
used as security constraints and loads are represented with 
constant power model. When related algorithm does not 
converge, constant current and constant impedance models are 
also tried. If the conventional algorithm converges, the 
preventive control settings define a secure system, with no 
further remedial action required. However, if the conventional 
method fails to converge, or becomes infeasible, this indicates 
that the system is overstressed and additional steps are required, 
notably to identify CCVs using a metaheuristic method. 
D.  Metaheuristic Approach for Identifying Critical Constraints 
From an optimization viewpoint, CCVs can be defined as the 
minimum set of constraints that cause the search space to be 
empty or infeasible, and are, therefore, essential for devising 
remedial actions to resolve overstressed system conditions. 
However, despite a large body of work on solving (SC)OPF 
problems using different metaheuristic algorithms aimed at 
minimizing various objective functions, there is no previous 
work on resolving infeasible nonlinear optimization problems 
through the minimization of the number/extent of constraint 
violations, or to identify CCVs using metaheuristic algorithms. 
Most of the conventional and metaheuristic optimization 
algorithms are developed as unconstrained search methods and 
their performance when search space is constrained strongly 
depends on the implemented penalty function (which converts 
constrained optimization problem into an unconstrained one), 
as well as on algorithms exploration/exploitation capabilities. 
Based on the previous analysis of metaheuristic methods 
(e.g. [24]-[25]), this paper uses a constriction based particle 
swarm optimization method (CPSO), as it performs better over 
the infeasible search spaces than other metaheuristic methods 
and requires no parameter tuning. While a detailed description 
of a basic CPSO algorithm is available in [26], two additional 
techniques are developed and integrated to the basic CPSO in 
this paper, in order to efficiently guide the search, while 
maintaining a good level of population diversity: decision 
variable preconditioning and new “particle best” criteria for 
updating. Moreover, a new penalty factor updating method is 
also developed for guiding the particles to minimize the 
number and extent of constraint violations in final solution.  
1) Variable scaling: Values of decision variables are often in 
quite different ranges, possibly resulting in numerical ill-
conditioning (conventional algorithms) or inefficient search 
(metaheuristic methods), especially if search space is narrow 
or infeasible. In PSO, for example, the positions and velocities 
of the particles are updated by inertia, social and cognition 
coefficients and two random numbers to calculate the next 
position. As the variables lie in different ranges, the applied 
updates are non-uniform and particles might hit the boundary 
in one dimension, but not in the other. To address this issue, 
all decision variables are transformed into a new space, with 
same lower and upper limits (0-100 in the paper). This 
modification resulted in improved computational performance 
and particle diversity over the iterations [27], Fig. 2.  
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Fig. 2  Particle diversity with proposed modifications to CPSO 
2) Modified personal-best updating criteria: The 
implemented CPSO uses Newton Raphson Power Flow 
(NRPF) for evaluating solution of each particle. Traditionally, 
the particle’s personal best is updated when it achieves an 
improvement in the fitness value, but as the algorithm is 
dealing with infeasible problems, there might be cases when 
the unconstrained power flow may not converge. These 
particles may be promoted to next stage if they are not treated 
properly. To avoid this problem, the modified criteria require 
each particle to satisfy two conditions: a) new fitness value is 
better than the old one, and b) the power flow has converged.  
3) Modified penalty factor method: While equality (power 
balance) constraints are automatically taken care of by the 
NRPF, inequality constraints are linked to objective function 
using linear penalty functions in (4), resulting in Lagrangian 
function, or penalized objective function, in (5). Metaheuristic 
methods need careful tuning of penalty factors, as otherwise 
search can be driven into an infeasible region. Therefore, a 
dynamic penalty factor updating method is formulated by (6), 
as it requires to set only the initial penalty factor values, KX, 
and, as the iterations progress, they will be updated 
automatically based on actual number of constraint violations. 
Initial penalty factors should be selected based on the priority 
of the constraints and in this paper the violation of reactive 
power generation is considered as more severe than violations 
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of voltage and thermal limits. All penalty factor values should 
be at least in the order 100’s, so a change in objective function 
with respect to a change in constraint can be identified and 
then used to guide the particles. It is exactly this sensitivity to 
the constraint violations which is the main parameter helping 
CPSO to minimize the number of constraint violations.  
 
𝜙𝜙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = �𝐾𝐾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 (𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑋𝑋)𝐾𝐾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 (𝑋𝑋 − 𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚𝑋𝑋𝑥𝑥)�𝑋𝑋 < 𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑋𝑋 > 𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚𝑋𝑋𝑥𝑥� (4) 
 𝐿𝐿 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑋𝑋) + 𝜙𝜙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑋𝑋,𝐾𝐾) (5) 
 𝐾𝐾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝐾𝐾𝑋𝑋𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝑖𝑖) (6) 
where: L – the penalized objective function, PFV, f – original 
objective function, OFV, K - the penalty factor for violating 
minimum and maximum limits of decision variable set X in ith 
iteration, NCV - number of constraint violations in the set X in 
the ith iteration. 
 
Fig.  3. Metaheuristic approach for identification of critical constraints. 
The overall search process is guided by penalized objective 
function values, rather than gradients of the objective function, 
as in conventional algorithms. The difference between the 
penalized function value (PFV) and original function value 
(OFV) is an indication of the severity of CCVs, i.e. problem 
infeasibility. As the iterations progress, the guided CPSO search 
will either lead to a zero measure of violation (i.e. all constraints 
satisfied), or, if there is no solution satisfying all constraints, the 
PFV will be used to minimize their number/extent. The 
remaining constraint violations are the “critical constraints” 
causing the infeasibility, as they cannot be satisfied with 
existing preventive control variables, or within their allowed 
ranges of variations.  
The applied CPSO algorithm treats all SCOPF constraints as 
soft, using exterior penalty functions. The parameter settings of 
the CPSO and constraint violation penalties are selected to 
strictly enforce the generation capability limits (Table I). 
TABLE I PARAMETERS AND PENALTY SETTINGS FOR APPLIED CPSO 
CPSO settings Penalty settings 
Population size 20 Reactive power 500 
Maximum number of iterations 600 Slack active power 100 
Social and cognition coefficient 1.494 Branch MVA 100 
Inertia weight 0.729 Bus voltage 100 
E.  Selection of the Most Effective Remedial Actions  
The final stage is to use information on CCVs to devise the 
optimal remedial actions for returning the system to secure 
state. After CCVs are identified, this can be done with either 
conventional or metaheuristic SCOPF. For that purpose, two 
factors are calculated [28]: a) active power injection sensitivity 
factor for line flows (PISF), which captures the sensitivity of the 
flow through a line between bus 𝑚𝑚 and 𝑗𝑗 with respect to a change 
in active power injection at bus 𝑘𝑘, and b) reactive power 
injection sensitivity factor for bus voltages (QISF), which 
captures the sensitivity of the voltage at bus 𝑚𝑚 with respect to 
reactive power injection at bus 𝑘𝑘 (slack bus constraint included).  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘 = 𝜕𝜕𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘
= Δ𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘
Δ𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘
 ; 𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝐵𝐵 𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎 (𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗) ∈ 𝐿𝐿 (7) 
𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘 = 𝜕𝜕𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑘𝑘
= Δ𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘
Δ𝑄𝑄𝑘𝑘
 ; 𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝐵𝐵 𝑋𝑋𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎 𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝐵𝐵 (8) 
where: B - bus index; L - line/branch index; Δ𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘  and Δ𝑄𝑄𝑘𝑘  - the 
changes in active and reactive power injection at bus k; ΔS𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘  - 
the change in apparent power flow in a branch (𝑚𝑚, 𝑗𝑗) due to Δ𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘; 
Δ𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘 - the change in voltage at bus 𝑚𝑚 due to Δ𝑄𝑄𝑘𝑘. 
If CCVs involve only bus voltage limit violations, the 
corresponding SCM is a VVC problem and the effective 
remedial actions should control reactive power injections at 
target buses. If CCVs involve a mixture of bus voltage and line 
loading limit violations, or only line limit violations, the 
corresponding SCM is a CM problem and the effective remedial 
actions should control both active and reactive power injections. 
The general steps are:  
1. Calculate PISFs and/or QISF for all buses with respect to the 
critically overloaded lines or undervoltage buses; 
2. Select the buses with the highest absolute PISF or QISF 
values as target buses for implementing selected remedial 
action and input corresponding parameters (e.g. load or 
generation at these buses) as new variables in the SCOPF;  
3. Solve the modified SCOPF employing relevant objective 
functions corresponding to the intervention considered. 
    1)  Optimal Control of Distributed Generation (DG): In 
the context of smart grid functionalities, the control of DG is 
approached as a practical option for system support services. In 
this paper, dispatching of DG active power is considered to 
relieve both line loading and bus voltage congestion and 
modified SCOPF problem considers DG active production as 
a control variable in two objective functions: minimizing of the 
overall fuel cost (“OFC”, including DG fuel cost) and active 
power losses (“L”) to optimally dispatch DG in addition to large 
system generation to resolve CCVs. 
    2)  Optimal Control of Reactive Power Injection: An 
effective approach for resolving bus voltage CCVs due to 
reactive power imbalance is to install controllable reactive 
power reserves at specific buses. In this paper, optimal 
placement and control of shunt capacitors as VVC is employed 
at buses where undervoltage-CCVs occur. The target buses, 
with the highest QISFs with respect to the voltages at critical 
buses, are equipped with shunt capacitors which are considered 
as a (continuous) control variable in the SCOPF. The SCOPF is 
YES
NO
YES
Formulate SOPF Problem
Apply suitable Numerical Algorithm 
Converge
Apply metaheuristic algorithm with suitable 
constraint handling
Metaheuristic iteration loop
Caculate difference between PFV and OFV
Identify critical constraint violations (CCVs)
Solution set with CCVs
Start
Solution 
set
Iteration = Max. Iteration
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then solved separately for three objective functions: minimize 
fuel cost (“F”), losses (“L”), and shunt capacitor use (“S”). 
    3)  Optimal Load Shedding and DSM Control 
A “last resort” emergency remedial actions available to 
network operator to resolve CCVs is load shedding. There are a 
number of potential approaches: (i) hard load shedding (HLS), 
(ii) optimal load shedding (OLS) and (iii) selective optimal load 
shedding (SOLS). These differ in terms of selected target buses 
and the proportion of load available to shed. 
In conventional approaches, the target buses for both HLS 
and OLS are typically associated with buses where immediate 
post-contingency constraint violations occur. While the HLS 
approach disconnects all load at target buses (100% load 
shedding), OLS defines loads at the target buses as control 
variables to be optimized by the SCOPF (0%-100% load 
shedding). In contrast, SOLS targets only a small number of 
buses with the highest PISFs/QISFs with respect to the critically 
overloaded lines, or critical bus voltages. Only loads at these 
buses are considered as a control variable and then required 
amount of disconnected load is minimized (0%-100% load 
shedding). The related SCOPF problem is then solved with 
three objective functions: minimizing fuel cost (“F”), losses 
(“L”) and disconnected load (“DL”), in order to provide the 
optimal operating point with zero security constraint violations. 
Similarly to load shedding, network operator may activate 
DSM at all, or some of the buses, based on the availability, 
priority and size of DSM-loads. In general, major electricity 
consumers will distribute their load into “critical”, “essential” 
and “non-essential” categories. Accordingly, the same approach 
for load shedding using the OLS and SOLS is applied for DSM, 
but it is assumed that up to 30% of the load at target buses is 
available for DSM without (significant) impact on customers.  
F. Stability Analysis of Selected Remedial Actions  
To be secure, the considered system must satisfy the steady 
state security constraints at pre- and post-contingency 
operating equilibrium states, as well as dynamic security 
constraints while transiting from these two states. Assuming 
proper controls are included in the mathematical formulation 
and that the formulation is feasible, SCOPF should provide 
solution for the future (post-contingency) operating state 
which is secure only from the steady security point of view.  
However, following the activation of the controls from the 
SCOPF solution, this new operating equilibrium state may or 
may not be reached, based on the system dynamics, i.e. ability 
of the system and its components to operate in a stable and 
controllable manner during the dynamic transition from pre- to 
post-contingency operating states. For that purpose, time 
domain simulations are used to ensure that the dynamic 
security/stability constraints are satisfied for a steady-state 
secure SCOPF solution obtained after optimal remedial 
actions are implemented. 
The time domain simulations are performed using [29] for a 
total duration of 60 sec, with the following steps: a) base case 
OPF on the pre-contingency network is run for the first 10 sec, 
b) the first and second line outages are simulated at 10 sec and 
15 sec, c) remedial actions (e.g. SOLs) are activated at 20 sec, 
d) generation and voltage set points are readjusted at 25 sec 
and simulation is run until 60 sec with no further events.  
The selected remedial action is considered to be “rotor 
angle stable” if and only if the relative angles of all generators 
reached steady state values and varied within the margin of 
±1800. If a relative rotor angle exceeded ±1800, the generator 
is assumed to lose synchronism with the rest of the system. 
Similarly, the selected remedial action is assumed to be 
“voltage stable” if the terminal voltages of all generators 
reached their steady state values and none of them was outside 
the 0.95 p.u. - 1.1 p.u. range.  
III.  RESULTS 
A.  Test Networks Used for Analysis 
To illustrate presented methodology and demonstrate that it 
can be scaled-up to larger systems, IEEE 30-bus, IEEE 39-bus 
and IEEE 57-bus test networks are selected, with complete 
information and data for their modelling available in [30]-[31]. 
B.  Post-Contingency Conditions and Overstressed System 
For all test networks, overstressed system conditions are 
obtained by simulating severe infeasible contingencies using an 
unconstrained power flow from a pre-contingency optimal 
operating point. These are shown in Table II, with “T” and “L” 
denoting transformers and lines. For each case, the number of 
resulting undervoltages (NUV), overvoltages (NOV) and line 
overloading (NOL) are shown. The type, extent and severity of 
constraint violations vary by contingency chosen. The list of 
CCVs and the corresponding computational time taken by PSO 
are presented in Table III. It can be seen that a large number of 
immediate post-contingency constraint violations reduce to a 
much smaller set of CCVs (most notably for IEEE-57 system). 
Although the computational time varies depending on the size 
of the network and level of stress, it is observed that the average 
computational time to identify CCVs is around 40 sec. This 
time is calculated based on performing numerous simulations 
on 14, 30, 39, 57, 110, 150-bus test networks. 
TABLE II LIST OF IMMEDIATE POST- CONTINGENCY CONSTRAINT VIOLATIONS 
Contingency NUV NOV NOL 
IEEE 30-bus 
L1-2 & T27-28 4 0 5 
L4-12 & T27-28 5 0 3 
IEEE 39-bus 
L5-6 & L6-7 3 0 6 
L21-22&L26-27 0 3 4 
IEEE 57-bus 
T7-29 & L8-9 35 0 5 
T7-29 & L46-47 18 1 1 
TABLE III LIST AND LOCATIONS OF CRITICAL CONSTRAINT VIOLATIONS 
Contingency NUV NOV NOL UV Buses OL Lines Time(s) 
IEEE 30 Bus  
L1-2 & T27-28 2 0 2 29;30 33(L22-24); 35(L24-25) 
14.34 
L4-12 & T27-28 2 0 2 29;30 33(L22-24); 35(L24-25) 
21.32 
IEEE 39-bus 
L5-6 & L6-7 0 0 2 / 3((L2-3); 9(L4-14) 36.04 
L21-22&L26-27 0 0 1 / 3((L2-3) 9.13 
IEEE 57 Bus  
T7-29 & L 8-9 6 0 0 24;27;28; 29;52;53 / 
76.34 
T7-29 & L46-47 6 0 0 24;27;28; 29;52;53 / 
70.54 
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C.  Optimal Load Shedding and DSM Control 
The load shedding approach is applied to the IEEE 30-bus 
network, as it has a mixture of line loading and bus voltage 
CCVs. Lines L22-24 and L24-25 are the most critical ones, for 
which security constraints cannot be fulfilled without shedding 
load at some selected or target buses (Table III). Table IV 
shows that the PISFs for these critical lines are highest at Buses 
29 and 30 indicating their significant influence on MVA flows 
in the critical lines (e.g., for the outage of L1-2 and T27-28, the 
injection of one MW at Bus 29 reduces the flows on L22-24 and 
L24-25 by 0.811 MVA and 1.168 MVA, respectively). Hence, 
Buses 29 and 30 are target buses for SOLS (Table V). For HLS 
and OLS approaches, target buses are these two and four other 
buses associated with post-contingency constraint violations 
(from unconstrained power flow), as indicated in Table V.  
The total disconnected MVA for IEEE 30-bus network with 
minimized fuel cost, losses, and disconnected load are shown in 
Table VI, with resulting objective function values in Table VII. 
The tables refer to “PSSE” and “PSO”, which are conventional 
and metaheuristic SCOPF methods, respectively. These are 
included to demonstrate that presented approach can be used 
with both methods (where possible) and to indicate differences 
in their performance. In the majority of cases, the PSSE and 
PSO results for the amount of disconnected loads and objective 
values are the same, or very close. The obvious differences arise 
with the minimum load shedding objective, where the PSO 
substantially outperforms the conventional approach. The 
largest difference is for the first contingency, where reduction in 
load shedding is 77% for the SOLS and 90% for OLS methods. 
In addition, the SOLS approach results in much lower levels of 
load shedding compared to the other methods. Similarly, load 
shedding analysis is carried out for 39-bus and the resulting 
disconnected MVA are shown in Table VIII. 
TABLE IV ACTIVE POWER INJECTION SENSITIVITY FACTORS FOR IEEE 30-BUS 
ISFs with outages of L1-2 and T27-28 
Branch\bus No B24 B25 B26 B27 B29 B30 
L22-24 -0.696 -0.752 -0.769 -0.781 -0.811 -0.831 a 
L24-25 0.000 -1.089 -1.112 -1.129 -1.168 -1.196 
ISFs with outages of L4-12 and T27-28 
Branch\bus No B24 B25 B26 B27 B29 B30 
L22-24 -0.801 -0.868 -0.887 -0.903 -0.937 -0.962 
L24-25 0.000 -1.086 -1.109 -1.126 -1.167 -1.195 
aBuses with high absolute ISFs  
TABLE V TARGET BUSES FOR LOAD SHEDDING  
Conti. SOLS OLS HLS 
IEEE 30-bus 
L1-2&T27-28 29, 30 3, 4, 24, 26, 29, 30 3, 4, 24, 26, 29, 30 
L4-12&T27-28 29, 30 3, 4, 24, 26, 29, 30 3, 4, 24, 26, 29, 30 
IEEE 39-bus 
L5-6 & L6-7 4 4,7,8 4,7,8 
L21-22&L26-27 4 3, 16, 24, 25, 26 3, 16, 24, 25, 26 
The line MVA flows before and after the load shedding are 
shown in Fig. 4. These results demonstrate that, while SCOPF 
analysis with only preventive controls (i.e. SCM with no load 
shedding) can reduce five-line loading constraint violations to 
two (denoted as critical overloading in Fig. 4), SCOPF analysis 
with remedial action (i.e. SCM with HLS, OLS, and SOLS) can 
alleviate all line loading constraint violations. 
TABLE VI TOTAL DISCONNECTED MVA WITH LOAD SHEDDING (IEEE 30-BUS)  
Contingency: L1-2 and T27-28 
Type of shed-> SOLS OLS HLS 
Objective PSO PSSE PSO PSSE PSO PSSE 
Min. Fuel cost  13.33 13.33 38.95 38.95 38.95 38.95 
Min. Active Loss  13.32 13.33 34.93 38.95 38.95 38.95 
Min. Shedding  3.07 13.33 3.93 38.95 NA NA 
Contingency: L4-12 and T27-28 
Type of shed-> SOLS OLS HLS 
Objective PSO PSSE PSO PSSE PSO PSSE 
Min. Fuel cost  13.33 13.33 38.95 38.95 38.95 38.95 
Min. Active Loss  13.33 13.33 37.38 38.95 38.95 38.95 
Min. Shedding  7.05 13.33 7.29 23.12 NA NA1 
1Not Applicable 
TABLE VII TOTAL DISCONNECTED MVA WITH LOAD SHEDDING (IEEE 39-
BUS) 
Contingency: L5-6 and L6-7 
Type of shed-> SOLS OLS HLS 
Objective PSO PSSE PSO PSSE PSO PSSE 
Min. Fuel cost  502.34 532.78 1055.64 1332.28 1332.28 1332.28 
Min. Active Loss  494.43 532.78 1077.72 1107.12 1332.28 1332.28 
Min. Shedding  452.23 532.78 497.83 754.07 NA NA 
Contingency: L21-22 and L26-27 
Type of shed-> SOLS OLS HLS 
Objective PSO PSSE PSO PSSE PSO PSSE 
Min. Fuel cost  523.10 532.78 1021.55 1605.18 1605.18 1605.18 
Min. Active Loss  515.74 532.57 847.12 842.72 1605.18 1605.18 
Min. Shedding  443.51 450.73 480.41 471.92 NA NA1 
TABLE VIII OPTIMAL OBJECTIVE VALUES (LOAD SHEDDING, IEEE 30-BUS)  
Contingency: L1-2 and T27-28 
Type of shed-> SOLS OLS HLS 
Objective PSO PSSE PSO PSSE PSO PSSE 
Fuel cost ($/MWhr) 787.27 787.54 703.29 703.48 703.22 703.48 
Active Loss (MW) 3.17 11.50 2.90 11.34 2.68 11.34 
Min Shed (MW) 2.92 13.00 3.32 15.63 NA NA 
Contingency: L4-12 and T27-28 
Type of shed-> SOLS OLS HLS 
Objective PSO PSSE PSO PSSE PSO PSSE 
Fuel cost ($/MWhr) 756.14 756.38 677.00 677.33 694.97 677.32 
Active Loss (MW) 2.57 8.66 1.91 7.72 3.88 7.71 
Min Shed (MW) 6.83 12.89 6.71 14.45 NA NA 
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Fig.  4. Line MVA flows with load shedding for IEEE 30-bus with contingencies 
L1-2 and T27-28 
The analysis was repeated for DSM with the OLS and SOLS 
approaches (denoted as OLS-DSM and SOLS-DSM). Target 
buses for OLS- and SOLS-based DSM are identified based on 
PISFs for critical lines (Table V). The resulting amounts of 
disconnected load (in MVA) are shown in Table IX. Once 
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again, the SOLS approach is better than the OLS in all cases, 
with significant improvements in some cases. The results of 
conventional and metaheuristic methods are similar in most 
cases, but PSO performs better for the load shedding objective.  
The convergence of the PSO algorithm for one contingency 
(L4-2 and T27-28) is shown in Fig. 5 for both OLS and SOLS 
cases for each of the objectives. This illustrates how the total 
number of security constraint violations reduces as the iterations 
progress. In all cases, the zero-security constraint violation in 
the figure indicates that all security constraints are fulfilled, but 
that there are variations in iterations  at which this is achieved. It 
is clear that in all cases there is a rapid reduction at the initial 
search stages, followed by a more steady progress. The OLS 
approach for minimizing fuel cost reaches zero violations most 
rapidly, but it should be noted that this case has the highest 
amount of load shedding. This suggests there is an important 
relationship (a trade-off) between the speed and efficiency. 
TABLE IX TOTAL DISCONNECTED MVA LOAD (SOLS-DSM AND OLS-DSM) 
Contingency: L1-2 and T27-28 
Type of shed-> SOLS OLS 
Objective PSO PSSE PSO PSSE 
Min. Fuel cost 4.00 4.00 11.68 11.69 
Min. Active Loss 4.00 4.00 9.86 11.69 
Min. Shedding 2.99 4.00 3.38 11.69 
Contingency: L4-12 and T27-28 
Type of shed-> SOLS OLS 
Objective PSO PSSE PSO PSSE 
Min. Fuel cost 8.55 8.55 11.68 11.69 
Min. Active Loss 8.55 8.55 11.64 11.66 
Min. Shedding 7.72 8.55 4.18 8.81 
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Fig.  5. Number of security constraint violations with iterations for PSO SCOPF 
with remedial actions (contingency L4-2 and T27-28) 
D.  Optimal Control of Distributed Generation (DG)  
The use of DG dispatch as a remedial action is demonstrated 
on IEEE 30-bus system, in which L22-24 and L24-25 loading 
constraints cannot be fulfilled without injecting active power. 
Table IV lists the bus PISFs for these two critical lines, with 
Buses 29 and 30 again the target buses for DG control. The DG 
at both considered buses is modelled as 5 MW units capable of 
being dispatched from zero to maximum. Their fuel cost is 
modelled with the following equations: 0.02Pg + 15 at Bus 29 
and 0.043Pg + 20 at Bus 30 with DGs assumed to provide only 
active power (characteristics of other generators were the same). 
The system is optimized for minimum fuel cost or losses for 
each set of contingencies. The results in Table X show the 
loading of the conventional generators and the two DG units, 
where outcomes of conventional and metaheuristic methods are 
broadly similar. However, the dispatch to minimize fuel cost is 
quite different from the one to minimize losses, with much 
greater use of DG at Bus 30in latter case. Additionally, the post-
contingency dispatch of conventional generators changes 
significantly from the pre-contingency one, indicating a large 
change between the two system operating points. 
The line MVA flows for contingency L1-2 and T27-28 
before and after DG dispatch are shown in Fig. 6. As all line 
CCVs are relieved after activating DG support, it can be 
concluded that DG is effective in alleviating both line loading 
and bus voltage congestions, irrespective of the considered 
objective function. DG does not necessarily need to be located 
near the critical lines to be effective. For example, the target 
buses (Bus 29 and 30) in presented analysis are not associated 
with the critical lines (L22-24 and L24-25), Table III.  
TABLE X OPTIMAL DG DISPATCH WITH RELEVANT OBJECTIVE VALUES  
Gen L1-2 and T27-28 L4-12 and T27-28 
@ OFC Loss OFC Loss 
Bus No PSSE PSO PSSE PSO PSSE PSO PSSE PSO 
1 130.0 129.72 50.00 53.04 158.79 150.34 50.01 57.24 
2 63.37 63.62 77.03 77.00 44.32 46.61 71.35 78.90 
5 25.29 25.18 49.38 50.00 20.00 17.88 49.99 50.00 
8 35.00 32.09 34.92 34.62 11.03 13.71 34.98 34.91 
11 21.00 21.38 29.94 30.00 10.01 15.42 29.98 20.11 
13 16.58 18.90 35.13 33.13 40.00 40.00 39.97 36.27 
29 (DG) 4.83 4.90 4.99 4.80 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.87 
30 (DG) 0.00 0.15 5.00 4.99 2.52 2.58 5.00 4.86 
Objective 
 value 
897.3 
$/MWhr 
900.1 
$/MWhr 
3.59 
MW 
4.24 
MW 
924.7 
$/MWhr 
927.9 
$/MWhr 
2.88 
MW 
3.78 
MW 
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Fig.  6. Line MVA flows with load shedding for IEEE 30-bus network 
(contingency: L4-12 and T27-28) 
E.  Optimal Control of Reactive Power Injection 
Unlike the previous remedial actions, reactive power control 
is demonstrated on IEEE 57-bus network, as the CCVs include 
only undervoltage violations (Table III) and the SCM is a VVC 
problem. Table XI shows the extent of the undervoltage CCVs  
after contingency (T7-29 and L8-9) and before SCOPF dispatch 
with reactive support, which are 1%-7% below a 95% limit. 
Reactive support (capacitors) are available at each of the critical 
buses and SCOPF is again run for three objectives (fuel, losses 
and reactive power injection). Table XII shows the resulting 
optimal reactive power injection values for one contingency.  
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The required reactive power support and objectives for PSSE 
and PSO are similar for the fuel cost minimization, but 
allocation of the injections between buses is quite different. For 
the loss minimization, PSO performs slightly worse than PSSE 
in terms of overall required reactive support and has almost 
twice higher losses. For minimizing reactive support, PSO gives 
zero or near zero injections at two of the three locations and 
much reduced required power. This suggests that PSO is more 
efficient in finding minimum number of required capacitors. 
TABLE XI BUS UNDERVOLTAGES FOR IEEE 57 BUS (BELOW 0.95 PU LIMIT) 
Contingency Bus undervoltages (%) with fuel cost min. B24 B27 B28 B29 B52 B53 
T7-29&L8-9 1.93 4.43 6.20 6.96 6.02 4.82 
T7-29&L46-47 1.08 2.45 3.99 4.61 3.19 1.72 
Contingency Bus undervoltages (%) with loss min. B24 B27 B28 B29 B52 B53 
T7-29&L8-9 2.14 4.23 5.97 6.71 5.72 4.49 
T7-29&L46-47 1.80 3.46 5.09 5.75 4.49 3.12 
TABLE XII OPTIMAL REACTIVE POWER INJECTION WITH RELEVANT OBJECTIVE 
VALUES FOR A CONTINGENCY T7-29 & L8-9 
Objective->  With minimized Fuel cost 
With minimized 
loss 
With minimized 
shunt 
Bus No PSSE PSO PSSE PSO PSSE PSO 
B24 7.58 3.60 3.05 4.71 2.87 0.03 
B27 2.63 7.14 4.09 1.84 3.67 1.17 
B28 2.45 2.57 4.30 4.76 3.63 4.23 
B29 2.53 3.97 4.36 6.82 3.58 3.95 
B52 2.39 1.02 3.80 1.30 3.38 5.90 
B53 5.54 4.75 3.38 4.73 3.09 0.00 
Total MVAr 23.12 23.05 22.98 24.16 20.20 15.28 
Objective  
value 
44757.5 
$/MWhr 
44861.0 
$/MWhr 
14.82 
MW 
28.59 
MW 
20.20 
MVAr 
15.28 
MVAr 
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Fig.  7. Voltage profile for IEEE 57-bus system with and without reactive power 
support (contingency T7-29 and L8-9) 
The effect of the reactive support is clearly visible in Fig. 7 
for contingency T7-29 and L8-9 before and after activating this 
remedial action. For immediate post-contingency, there are 35 
undervoltage violations and presented approach suggests that 
reactive power injection at only six buses will resolve them, 
minimizing both number of target buses and switching actions. 
F.  Stability Analysis of Remedial Actions    
Time domain simulations of the transition from pre- to post-
contingency steady state secure operating points is done for 
two reasons: a) to additionally check whether the system can 
reach new stable operating state, or not, and b) to check 
whether the presented remedial action framework does not 
result in any voltage or angle instability. 
The results of dynamic simulations for generator terminal 
voltages, rotor angles and speeds for IEEE 39-bus network 
with the activation of SOLS following a double line 
contingency (L5-6&L6-7) are shown in Fig. 8. It can be 
observed that all the relative rotor angles and speeds are 
reached steady state, and none of the relative rotor angles are 
exceeded ±1800 margin. In addition, the terminal voltages of 
all the machines are reached steady state which are same as 
the AVR set points computed by the remedial action. This 
confirms that the proposed remedial action does not initiate 
any voltage and angle instability problems.  
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c) Terminal voltages of generators 
Fig.  8. Dynamic stability simulations for generator terminal voltages, rotor 
angles and speeds for IEEE 39-bus network with the activation of SOLS 
following a double line contingency (L5-6&L6-7) 
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IV.  DISCUSSION 
It is widely accepted that security constraint management 
can be more economically efficient option than further 
investment in the transmission network [1]. Accordingly, 
system operators invest significantly in procuring various active 
and reactive power ancillary services to mitigate constraint 
violations during overstressed or emergency conditions to 
deliver high security and quality of  at all, or most of the time. 
The presented remedial action framework incorporates the 
concept of critical constraint violations (CCVs) in the unified 
algorithmic and computational tools for both identifying the 
overstressed system conditions and selecting the most effective 
remedial actions. The framework is based on the CCV 
classification and effective implementation of remedial actions 
using injection sensitivity factors, aimed at minimizing required 
system reserves (for economic operation) and required number 
of switching actions (for a more secure transition from pre- to 
post-disturbance secure operating states). The following 
observations from the results and analysis presented in the paper 
support these assertions. 
Although there are differences in amounts of disconnected 
load, required DG and installed capacitors for various objective 
functions, all of the proposed remedial actions ensure secure 
post-disturbance operating point with zero constraint violations.  
The proposed SOLS and SOLS-DSM control approaches 
require disconnection of less load at a fewer buses compared to 
the HOLS (activated by under-voltage or under-frequency 
protection at the local level) or OLS (activated by the operator 
using computer controls over the regulated region). Taking 
advantage of adaptive relays, whose protection settings can be 
changed in real time, SOLS approach can be efficiently 
integrated into the existing protection systems.  
The traditional undervoltage and/or under-frequency load 
shedding controls tends to shed loads at the buses experiencing 
undervoltage/under-frequency conditions (i.e. overloading) to 
prevent the network from entering insecure region. However, 
from both an economic and secure operation viewpoints, these 
buses may not be the most effective for constraint management 
in large and highly interconnected networks. This is evidenced 
by the presented SOLS approach, in which target buses for load 
control are not the ones associated with overloaded lines.  
The presented reactive power control approach requires 
minimum reactive support at a minimum number of buses to 
alleviate the voltage congestion. Hence, it can help to reduce 
switching surges and voltage spikes which are often associated 
with the spurious operation of voltage relays. 
The important feature of the presented approach is that it 
does not aim to replace the existing methods for handling 
emergency conditions. Rather, in providing a computational 
means and tools for identifying and classifying the CCVs, it can 
extend the available support to system operators. The approach 
could form a part of an offline analysis tools, offered as a 
lookup table or in the form of a case-based reasoning method. 
The approach could form part of offline analyses and be offered 
as part of a lookup table or some form of case-based reasoning 
method. The method could conceivably be incorporated as part 
of online systems as the straightforward manner in which the 
PSO algorithm can be parallelized means its elapsed time will 
be sufficiently short despite a longer computational burden 
(~2.5 processor minutes). This allows it to be broadly 
competitive with conventional methods requiring a few seconds 
to provide the solution. Although 2.5 processor minutes are 
required to simulate total 600 iterations, CPSO requires only 
about 40 sec (average) to identify the CCVs and 30-100 sec to 
compute the remedial action.  
In addition to applications in operational studies, e.g. to 
indicate optimal location and sizing of shunt capacitors, 
distributed generation and storage systems, etc. The remedial 
action framework can also be used for strategic (day ahead, 
weekly, monthly or annual) planning and selecting (or inviting) 
potential bidders for the provision of optimal system support 
and ancillary services. The repeated SCOPF analysis, for 
example, with severe contingency events over forecasted energy 
demand, or for various load distributions (using Monte Carlo 
approach) can be used to plan various active and reactive power 
ancillary services for improved congestion management and 
volt-var control, respectively.  
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presented a remedial action framework for 
improved security constraint management to mitigate system 
emergency and overstressed operating conditions. The practical 
relevance of the proposed framework is demonstrated on three 
widely used IEEE test networks, where the presented results 
indicate its value for system operational and planning studies. 
From the optimization perspective, the presented framework 
can help planners to resolve infeasible cases in optimization 
models by identifying critical constraint violations and devising 
effective preventive actions. From the operational perspective, 
the presented results provide an initial confirmation that the 
framework can be incorporated into dynamic system stability 
analysis of the transitions between pre- and post-contingency 
steady state secure operating points (calculated from the steady-
state security analysis), helping to minimize required switching 
actions and overall implementation of the devised remedial 
actions. By identifying minimum number and extent of CCVs, 
i.e. by detecting critical alarms from possibly large number of 
activated post-contingency alarms, the presented framework 
also helps the system operators to deal with “alarm flooding”. 
On the other hand, by effective handling of critical security 
constraints and by allowing network operation at, or near the 
technical security limits, the presented approach has further 
potential to be used for exploiting unused (“hidden”) network 
capacity, e.g. to host more renewable generation, or supply 
higher demands.  
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